

India- wider context

1919 GB Empire largest ever-land from Ger/Ottoman-mandated terr.

Problems

1 Dominions wanted clarity on status

2 USA/USSR- anti empire

3 Costs

1920's opposition rose in colonies-rise of nationalism e.g. Ireland/ Egypt

Prob. with colonial economies after Wall Street Crash.

1930s probs in Palestine-Iraq (mandate) indp –Dominions force Statute of Westminster 1931-1930s GB having huge problems with India

India population 400 million, ruled by Viceroy

All India Congress Party-want Indian Indp. Under Gandhi-GB tried to fix prob by Government of India Act 1935 (built on an earlier act of 1919) - provincial assemblies/local govt- Viceroy still did defence, foreign affairs Muslim/Hindu tension.

World War 2

Declaration of War –Viceroy declared war on Ger on behalf of India – consulted no Indian leaders-Congress ordered all members to resign provincial ministries

In Lahore Resolution 1942 Muslim League and its leader Jinnah demand separate Muslim state. Atlantic Charter 1941-all people have a right to indp -USA put pressure on GB to grant indp

Cripps Mission 1942 -offered Dominion status but Congress and ML did not agree.

Quit India-- Gandhi and Congress demanded GB out immediately-Gandhi jailed Quit India campaign put down Fall of Singapore 1942 –showed India that GB could be defeated Only 50,000 GB soldiers in India- so hard to put down trouble. “.5 million Indians joined the GB army-most of these wanted indp and Indian civil service ready to take over. GB broke after WW2.

Why did GB quit India

- 1 Indian nationalism-Congress party demanded indp
- 2 Gandhi in 1920=1930-non violent disobedience –led to Govt of India Act 1935-increasing local control
- 3 Educated leaders –nat. leaders all educated/middle class-and common English language plus telephone/telegraph meant easy to organise
- 4 Jap successes in WW2 showed GB weak
- 5 Attitude of GB-wanted prevent a civil war –keep indp India in commonwealth
- 6 Attlee Labour party wan 1945 election-ant imperial
- 7 Influences from USA/USSR

What were the steps to Independence?

Wavell proposal 1945 Wavell was Viceroy tried to get Con/ML to agree to a system for transferring power-proposed an Executive Council with both Hin/Mus. Disagreement on how Muslims on E Council would be picked-M L wanted to pick them but Con Party wanted to nominate some. Idea failed.

Labour Govt under Attlee backed Indian Indp-wanted a new election for provincial councils and set up group to work on new constitution.

1946 election –Congress party won most seats but Muslim areas elected Muslims-showed demand for a Pakistan strong

Cabinet Mission 1946 Atlee sent 3 person team to get agreement between Mus/Hin to aid quick move to Indp India. Stafford Cripps went. Indian leaders met at Simla Conference 1946-Mission proposed federal India with provincial governments Nehru claimed this would lead to a Congress controlled India-Jinnah and ML withdrew. The May statement was made to show the mission had failed. Now the mission proposed a Constituent Assembly which would draw up a new constitution for a united state.

Failure of the mission meant there was no chance of an agreed united India.

To show they wanted an indep Pakistan the ML call for Direct Action Day -16 August 1946-meant to be peaceful but led to clashes between Mus/Hin. 6000 dead mostly Muslin-no chance of a united country-Wavell warned GB that India on verge of a civil war.

Interim govt set up 1946-no Mus-refused to join initially. Nehru acted as Pm. ML eventually took part all leaders went to London –but no progress.

Mountbatten new viceroy 1947

Got on well with Congress leaders but not Mus League>Jinnah told him indep Pakistan needed. Plan Balkan Mount proposed 11 British provinces decide if they were in or out of indep India or grouped in a larger

collection of states-the princely states would do the same. Nehru said this would lead to break up and conflict so plan dropped

Mount new plan-Menon/Partition plan-proposed

- 2 states-India/Pak
- Both get Dominion status in Commonwealth
- Each provincial assembly that would decide-join India or Pak or go Indp
- Princely states would do the same
- The out date was moved from June 1948-15 August 1947

Gandhi's role

Had completed campaign non violent civil disobedience in 1920s-1930s-weakened BG rule-resulted in Govt of India Act 1935-power given to provinces. His Quit India campaign during WW 2 failed. In 1945-he was 76-had resigned as leader of Congress party but still important consulted by Wavell, Mount and new leaders of Congress

He wanted a united India with Mus/Hin living together-other Congress leaders felt a compromise was needed to avoid civil war. He lived in most violent areas (east Bengal) –tried get locals to stop fighting-some listened. When the Cabinet mission spoke to him he wanted power given to the Congress party so it could decide the future but he proposed Jinnah form the govt with Hindu majority. At Simla conference he apposed partition. He had Nehru elected president of Congress party-against Partition Plan-Wanted unity-even proposed Muslims put in charge of united India-this idea rejected by Congress leaders. At Indp –aug 1947 went on a fast to create peace –local leaders promised to stop violence. He was shot dead by Hindu fanatic who blamed him for partition and for giving too much to Pak

Summary his methods undermined GB in India-violent methods to GB rule rejected.

Division

Indian Indp act 1946 -2 countries –Muslims form East and West Pak. East Bengal want to Pak. Boundary drawn up by Cyril Radcliffe in 6 weeks-difficult to draw boundary in mixed areas. Princely states – majority joined India. Army police, civil service divided 80/20. Kashmir majority Muslim-with Hindu prince. Mount wanted it to go to Pak but prince joined India

Results of partition Civil war avoided but massacre of Hin/Mus-7 million Mus and 7

Million Hindu on move-1 Million killed-mostly in Punjab. India was largest of colonies to get Indp-so it acted as a symbol for others. Jinnah became governor general of Pak but died soon after-the military took over Civil war in 1971 East Pak became Bangladesh. India and Pak were republics but recognised king of head of Commonwealth but not of state

Was partition and violence inevitable?

Yes

Mus/Hin relations so poor it was inevitable

Gandhi wanted united India but his actions worsened relations

Violence on Direct day only made things worse. Mount seeing the problem had given up on the idea of a united India

Small GB army could not hold Law and order

Congo-Katanga Crisis

The United Nations' role in the Congo crisis between 1960 and 1964 saw its largest deployment of men and some of its most controversial actions. Until 1960, the Congo had been a colony of Belgium but in 1960, Belgium announced that it was giving the Congo its independence. Belgium gave the Congo just five months to get itself ready for independence despite the fact that it was clearly unprepared for such a task.

The independent Congo Republic was declared on June 30th, 1960. Its Prime Minister was Patrice Lumumba and its president was Joseph Kasavubu. In the first week of July, the army mutinied against the remaining white officers that lead the Congolese army and numerous attacks took place against Europeans in general.

The mutiny immediately took away any authority the civilian government had. It also created a state of near panic within the Congo as 100,000 Belgians lived there primarily in or near the capital Leopoldville. In response to the crisis, the Belgian government sent Belgian paratroopers to protect Belgian citizens in the Congo. This was an illegal act as the Congo was an independent nation and free from Belgian rule. The government of the Congo had not invited the troops in.

Such problems were made worse when the mineral-rich area of Katanga in southern Congo was declared independent by Moise Tshombe who lead the people in Katanga.

Katanga produced copper, 60% of the world's uranium and 80% of the world's industrial diamonds. Tshombe was backed by the European companies that worked in Katanga as they hoped to take a cut from the

considerable profits that could be made from mining such resources. Katanga had the potential to make Congo one of the more wealthy African states. Without it, the new nation would remain poor.

With such chaos ensuing, Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for help. The Security Council created an army to restore law and order to the Congo. It numbered nearly 10,000 troops. It was given four tasks:

- Restore law and order and maintain it.
- Stop other nations from getting involved with the crisis.
- Assist in building the nation's economy
- Restore political stability.

The United Nations force was only allowed to use force as a means of self-defence and it was not allowed to take sides between the government in Leopoldville and the government of Tshombe in Elizabethville.

Almost immediately, things went wrong for the United Nations force. Lumumba asked the United Nations to use the military force to crash the power of Tshombe in Katanga. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, refused permission for this. Lumumba immediately accused the United Nations of siding with Tshombe because of Katanga's rich mineral reserves. He also accused the United Nations of siding with the rich European companies that mined the region.

Lumumba's anger at the United Nations failure to act against Katanga, lead to him asking the USSR for help. The Russians provided Lumumba's government with military equipment that gave him the opportunity to launch an attack on Katanga. This attack failed and President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and appointed the chief of the Congo's army – Colonel Mobutu – as the new Prime Minister.

Lumumba set up a rival government in Stanleyville in the east of the country. However, his murder by mercenaries removed him from the problem. Through all of this the United Nations could do nothing as it had agreed not to take sides and only to fire in self-defence.

For the first six months of 1961, there were four groups that claimed to lead the Congo:

- 1) Mobutu's government based in Leopoldville
- 2) Lumumba's supporters based in Stanleyville
- 3) Tshombe's 'government' in Elizabethville, Katanga and
- 4) A breakaway 'government' in Kasai province led by King Albert Kalonji – though it was a self-appointed title!

Lumumba and Kalonji's groups both had weapons off of the Russians and the country by the summer of 1961 seemed to be on the verge of implosion. A vicious civil war seemed a real possibility.

The United Nations up to this point had not done a great deal to bring stability to the new nation. In response to the crisis, the Security Council gave permission for the United Nations army based there to use force to prevent a civil war occurring. This was not needed as in August 1961, three of the four parts met to form a new parliament in Leopoldville that was to be led by Cyrille Adoula. The only group that was not part of this was Tshombe's Katanga.

Adoula asked the United Nations to provide military support for an attack on Katanga as he made it his first task to remove Tshombe, as he believed

that while Tshombe was effectively in charge of Katanga, the Congo would never have peace. In August 1961, 5,000 United Nations troops launched an attack on Katanga. Though they captured key points in the province, they did not get Tshombe as he had fled to Rhodesia.

The United Nations itself was thrown into some chaos when Dag Hammarskjöld flew to Rhodesia to see Tshombe. However, the United Nations Secretary-General was killed during this trip when his plane crashed. He was replaced by U Thant who agreed to another attack by United Nations troops on Katanga in December 1961. As a result, Tshombe agreed to meet Adoula to discuss issues. The talks lasted for nearly a year and achieved very little. In late 1962, the United Nations force in the Congo attacked Katanga again. This led to Tshombe fleeing the Congo and in January 1963, Katanga was re-united with the rest of the Congo.

Was the work of the United Nations in this crisis a success?

Many believed that it had fulfilled its four objectives. The country had not descended into civil war; Russia had been kept out of a sensitive area in Africa; the Congo was kept as a whole by the end of 1963 and political stability had been achieved. Also the United Nations had taken responsibility for the humanitarian programme needed in the Congo. Famine and epidemics had been avoided by the use of United Nations sponsored food and medical programmes.

However, not every nation was pleased by what the United Nations had done. Russia, France and Belgium refused to pay their part of the \$400 million that was needed to pay for the cost of the Congo operation. This nearly pushed the United Nations to bankruptcy.

Those nations that had supported the United Nations were also critical of some parts of what the United Nations did. The role of Dag Hammerskjöld was criticised as it was felt that he had over-reached his authority regarding what the United Nations could do and what it could not. Supporters were also wary of the fact that the United Nations had taken sides in an effort to bring peace to the Congo.

France

France has been a multi-cultured society for centuries. In fact a law which states it is illegal to collect data on ethnicity and race drew its influence from the 1789 revolution. Although immigration existed in France for generations, the immigration rate took a considerable growth in the early twentieth century, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s. After World War I the population of France had decreased significantly. This, coupled with a low fertility rate meant that France had no option but to open herself to immigration in order to make an economic recovery. These immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe; Africa; Asia; and Armenia, after the Armenian genocide of 1915*. At his period the most common religion in France was Catholicism, and Judaism was the second most popular. After the Second World War the situation changed. France's fertility rates were now considerably higher. However, the economic climate was thriving so much that France could afford a second wave of mass immigration. Most of these were Portuguese, Arabs and North Africans. The high level of immigrants coming to France continued up until the late 1970s.

In October 1973, members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (or OAPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo. The embargo, which lasted for five months, was in response to the U.S. resupplying Israeli military during the Yom Kippur war. The so called 1973 Oil Crisis* seriously affected French economic industry. Therefore, France was no longer able to support such high rates of immigration. Several laws were put into place to secure immigration and give more power to the police, allowing them even to perform random identity checks. Such laws included the Bonnet Laws* (1980), the Pyrefitte Laws* (1981) and the Pasqua Laws* (1986). The general

consensus among the French population during the 1980s was one of resentment towards all immigrants. This was illustrated with a rise in racism, racial attacks, and the increasing popularity afforded to right-wing parties; in particular Jean Marie Le Pen* and the *Front National* party.*

This study looks at race relations and racial intolerance in France during the 1980s.

Political developments in France in the 1980s: an overview

As presidential elections beckoned in France at the beginning of the 1980s, a sense of unrest was evident in French politics. An oil crisis in 1979, just six years after a similar crisis led to a global depression, triggered a further erosion of living standards and worsened unemployment, placing immense pressure from the *Partie Socialiste* on the liberal president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

On the right, Jacques Chirac's Gaullist RPR party exploited public unhappiness at the perceived diminution of France's national sovereignty and standing in the superpower-dominated Cold War world, directing particular criticism at France's increased collaboration with NATO and moves towards closer European co-operation. Consequently, although Giscard d'Estaing overcame Chirac's challenge in the first round of voting in the **presidential elections of 1981**, he was defeated by François Mitterand of the Socialists in the second round on 10th May, thus conceding the Elysée Palace to the left for the first time in 25 years. The Socialists also won the parliamentary elections in that year.

Mitterand had already established himself as a significant political figure long before his

accession to the presidency, serving as a minister eleven times under the Fourth Republic. He had become de Gaulle's major political opponent, declaring the establishment of the Fifth Republic to be a *coup d'état permanent*. Although his political background placed him on the left of French politics, he did not join the PS until 1971. Many considered him to be ideologically part of the French radical tradition, concerned with social justice and fairness, and wary of the excesses of Marxism and capitalism. A more critical viewpoint was that Mitterand was a cunning strategist whose achievements in making the PS electorally successful depended not just on galvanizing left wing support, but also presenting himself through political marketing as attractive to right wing voters disillusioned with the Giscard era.

The perception of Mitterand as opportunistic was lent further credence by his toughening of immigration policies in response to the **rise of Jean Marie Le Pen's right wing *Front National***. After the oil crisis of 1973, the legal entry of immigrant workers had been severely restricted and Giscard designed a policy of voluntary repatriation. FN gains after 1983 led Mitterand to further restrict immigrants' entry into France, with the introduction of a new *Code de la nationalité* making it increasingly difficult for immigrants to obtain asylum status and for immigrants' children to acquire French nationality.

In 1985, Mitterand tried to exploit the rise of the FN to his own advantage by introducing proportional representation for parliamentary elections. He reasoned that this would allow the FN to win enough seats in 1986 to scupper Chirac's chances of a parliamentary majority. However, this tactic failed as Chirac won a small majority anyway while the FN won 35 seats, thus forcing Mitterand to appoint Chirac as prime

minister and setting in train an unprecedented and uneasy period of *cohabitation* between left and right.

The nature of the contending roles of president and prime minister in this new dispensation was constitutionally uncertain, but as Chirac saw himself as Mitterand's rival in the 1988 presidential election, he was reluctant to challenge Mitterand's assumption of authority over foreign affairs and defence policy, even though nothing in the constitution declared such matters to be presidential domains. Chirac instead concentrated on dominating the domestic agenda while Mitterand was perceived as the elder statesman on the international stage. As the 1988 elections, approached, it was clear that the nomination of the right would be strongly contested.

Jean Marie Le Pen's strong showing forced Chirac into a dilemma: if he attacked him too strongly, he would alienate potential second ballot supporters but if he did not tackle Le Pen's policies, he might lose moderate conservatives who abhorred le Pen's extremism. **Le Pen performed very strongly in the 1988 first ballot, indicating the extent to which the race issue had become so contentious.**

However, Mitterand enjoyed a comfortable victory over Chirac in the second round. As the decade came to a close, it was evident that the race issue would endure as a sensitive one into the 1990s as the „**headscarf affair**’ placed traditional French secularism under scrutiny. Continuing violence and disaffection in the *Maghrebi* suburbs allied with the consolidation of FN support would test France's adherence to the principle of assimilation and integration.

Additional reading for honours

Since the end of the Second World War, France has become an ethnically diverse country. Today, approximately five percent of the French population is non-European and non-white. This does not approach the number of non-white citizens in the United States (roughly 15-25%, depending on how Latinos are classified). Nevertheless, it amounts to at least three million people, and has forced the issues of ethnic diversity onto the French policy agenda. France has developed an approach to dealing with ethnic problems that stands in contrast to that of many advanced, industrialized countries. Unlike the United States, Britain, or even the Netherlands, France maintains a "color-blind" model of public policy. This means that it targets virtually no policies directly at racial or ethnic groups. Instead, it uses geographic or class criteria to address issues of social inequalities. It has, however, developed an extensive anti-racist policy repertoire since the early 1970s. Until recently, French policies focused primarily on issues of hate speech—going much further than their American counterparts—and relatively less on issues of discrimination in jobs, housing, and in provision of goods and services.

Long a country of immigration, France became a multi-ethnic society after World War Two, when millions of immigrants arrived on French soil to take up jobs in the boom years between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. In addition to large numbers of migrants from Southern Europe, non-white workers arrived from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and South-East Asia (all areas of French colonial holdings until the 1950s and 1960s), as well as from countries like Turkey and from French overseas departments. Traditionally viewed as temporary economic migrants, these individuals have increasingly been accepted as permanent residents in France. Many have taken up citizenship and

brought over families or had children in France. This has led to the transformation of France into a multi-ethnic society, even though many continue to refer to non-whites in the country as "immigrants" regardless of where they were born.

Unlike many other West European countries, and very much unlike English-speaking immigrant societies such as the United States, Canada or Australia, France has intentionally avoided implementing "race-conscious" policies. There are no public policies in France that target benefits or confer recognition on groups defined as races. For many Frenchmen, the very term race sends a shiver running down their spines, since it tends to recall the atrocities of Nazi Germany and the complicity of France's Vichy regime in deporting Jews to concentration camps. Race is such a taboo term that a 1978 law specifically banned the collection and computerized storage of race-based data without the express consent of the interviewees or a waiver by a state committee. France therefore collects no census or other data on the race (or ethnicity) of its citizens. Political leaders are nonetheless aware that race and ethnicity matter. To counter problems of ethnic disadvantage, they have constructed policies aimed at geographical areas or at social classes that disproportionately contain large number of minorities. The Educational Priority Zones (ZEP) initiative, for example, funnels supplemental money to disadvantaged school districts, many of which contain elevated numbers of immigrant ethnic minorities and their children. However, politicians and policymakers have insisted that the goals of such policies are to better the lives of localities or of all people in need, and have avoided highlighting the racial and ethnic implications of their initiatives. So far, this has been relatively successful, in that there have been few outcries among whites against such policies, even though the far right National Front party (led

by Jean-Marie Le Pen) has won many votes based on relatively widespread anti-immigrant sentiment.

French leaders have also dealt with the challenges of racial and ethnic pluralism through anti-racist laws and policies. The law of 1972 continues to form the foundation of France's national institutions. It contains four principal elements. First, it bans hate speech, making racial defamation and provocation to racial hatred or violence punishable by criminal law. Second, it outlaws discrimination in employment and in provision of goods and services by public or private actors, also making these criminal offences. Third, it establishes provisions that allow the state to ban groups that seek to promote racism. Fourth, it institutionalized the legal role of non-governmental anti-racist associations as partners in fighting racism, permitting them to instigate and to take part in court cases of racism as "civil parties"—an official status that confers rights on associations—even when they have not been directly harmed.

In 1990, France extended its anti-racist institutions in three new ways through a major piece of legislation known as the Gayssot law, named for its sponsor in the National Assembly. France incorporated a ban on Holocaust denial into its hate speech provisions. It is now illegal in France to claim that the Holocaust did not take place. Second, the legislation permits judges—at their discretion—to impose an additional penalty on parties convicted of racist crimes, depriving them of some of their civil rights (notably the right to run for and to be elected to public office). Finally, the 1990 law institutionalized a high-profile discussion of racism by mandating an annual report on the topic, published by the National Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH). Although some of the steps taken were controversial at the time the legislation was passed—

notably the ban on Holocaust denial and the power to deprive individuals of their civil rights—on the whole these institutions have been widely accepted in French political circles and by French society.

It is useful to contrast the French approach to fighting racism with those in the United States or in Britain. Relative to other countries, France has proven less interested in and adept at punishing discrimination in jobs, housing, and in provision of goods and services. It has been criticized for relying on the criminal law to prosecute such offences, because the penal code requires a higher burden of proof than the civil code. Until recently, France's anti-racist associations and the French state have been keener on fighting hate speech, as exemplified by the legislative ban on Holocaust denial, something that would seem extreme in Britain or North America. Conviction rates for discrimination are quite low (ranging in the single digits for most years since 1972 in a country of over sixty million inhabitants), and are surpassed by conviction rates for hate speech crimes. It must be noted, however, that prosecutions for Holocaust denial, employing the penalty of deprivation of civil rights, and banning racist groups are not often undertaken by French officials.

Just as the United States has increasingly turned its attention to hate speech and hate crimes over the past five years, so has France recently begun to pay more attention to issues of discrimination. Since the late 1990s, there has been a steady number of reports by anti-racist associations and other actors highlighting the level of racial or ethnic discrimination in housing projects, discotheques, and places of employment. The government recently addressed these concerns by establishing a racism hotline that residents could call if they experienced discrimination. The operators were overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of complaints over the first few months, thousands of which

they forwarded to new regional coordinating agencies that were designed to monitor and combat racial discrimination. Whether these recent institutional structures reflect sustained attention to issues of discrimination and whether they will translate into greater numbers of convictions remains to be seen.

In conclusion, France has maintained its official color-blind approach to race relations in spite of growing numbers of ethnic minorities on its territory and in contrast to other European countries facing similar demographic shifts. In part, this tendency can be explained by the Revolutionary and Republican traditions of treating all citizens equally before the law. In part, this can be accounted for by the memory of France's Vichy history and by the fears among the mainstream political class of a revival of far-right politics as embodied by the National Front. There are, however, pressures for more race- or ethnicity-conscious institutions in France. With the weakening of the National Front as of the late 1990s, with the increasing attention to the effects of discrimination in society, and perhaps with the better understanding of other European countries' more race-conscious approaches to fighting racism (within the context of the ever-closer European Union), France may eventually begin to move away from its strict color-blind model.